Plugin system has no protection against man in the middle attacks and similar

[manuel.reimer@…]

I had a closer look at how the plugin system works.

That the list itself is fetched via HTTPS is a good start, but it only contains a list of plugins. Most of them are loaded from HTTP sources.

This whole system should be protected in some way so it is not possible to replace the plugin file with some kind of malware.

Maybe a simple solution could be if the list, which is loaded via HTTPS, contains a checksum of the plugin file. If the fetched file does not match the checksum, then display error and don't install the plugin.

Repository Root: http://josm.openstreetmap.de/svn
Build-Date: 2015-06-16 21:45:58
Last Changed Author: Don-vip
Revision: 8491
Repository UUID: 0c6e7542-c601-0410-84e7-c038aed88b3b
Relative URL: ^/trunk
URL: http://josm.openstreetmap.de/svn/trunk
Last Changed Date: 2015-06-16 23:27:08 +0200 (Tue, 16 Jun 2015)
Last Changed Rev: 8491

Identification: JOSM/1.5 (8491 en) Linux Arch Linux
Memory Usage: 352 MB / 1772 MB (251 MB allocated, but free)
Java version: 1.7.0_85, Oracle Corporation, OpenJDK 64-Bit Server VM
VM arguments: [-Djosm.restart=true]

[michael2402]

All plugins are downloaded using HTTPS now, this should be as secure as we can get with automated checksums.